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Abstract
Although stock options are commonly observed in chief executive o±cer (CEO) com-
pensation contracts, there is theoretical controversy about whether stock options are part of
the optimal contract. Using a sample of Fortune 500 companies, we solve an agency model
calibrated to the company-speci¯c data and we ¯nd that stock options are almost always
part of the optimal contract. This result is robust to alternative assumptions about the
level of CEO risk-aversion and the disutility associated with their e®ort. In a supplementary
analysis, we solve for the optimal contract when there are no restrictions on the contract
space. We ¯nd that the optimal contract (which is characterized as a state-contingent payo®
to the CEO) typically has option-like features over the most probable range of outcomes.
iStock Options and Chief Executive O±cer Compensation
Over the past decade there has been an explosion in the use of equity-based compensation
(especially stock options) for top executives (e.g., Murphy (1999) and Ittner, Lambert, and
Larcker (2003)). Despite the growing popularity of stock options, there is considerable
academic and professional debate regarding the relative costs and bene¯ts of equity-based
compensation. Some observers view these plans as providing high-powered incentives that
align the interests of employees with those of shareholders. They also contend that stock
options help attract and retain scarce managerial and technical talent. However, critics claim
that options give away too much value by diluting the interests of shareholders. Perhaps
based on this claim, some companies are dropping their stock option in favor of restricted
stock (e.g., Carter, Lynch, and Tuna (2007) and Frederic W. Cook & Co. (2006)).
One especially pointed academic critique is that stock options are an ine±cient mech-
anism for compensating executives relative to restricted stock (e.g., Meulbroek (2001) and
Hall and Murphy (2002)). Similarly, Dittmann and Maug (2007) conclude that stock op-
tions should almost never be part of the compensation contract for chief executive o±cers
(CEOs). In contrast, Kadan and Swinkels (2006) develop and test an agency model where
stock options dominate restricted stock when non-viability (or bankruptcy) risk is zero. Ase®
and Santos (2005) also suggest that option grants are a powerful instrument for providing
incentives to the agent. Thus, there is considerable debate in the prior literature about the
optimality of stock option compensation for senior-level executives.
The purpose of this paper is to further investigate the use of stock options in compen-
sation contracts for CEOs. We ¯rst develop an agency model that mimics the real world
contracting problem between the board (acting on behalf of shareholders) and the CEO.
1Some of the important features of our model are that the CEO's compensation contract is
limited to ¯xed salary, at-the-money stock options, and restricted stock, the ¯xed salary is
assumed to be nonnegative (i.e., there is limited liability for the agent), the agent is assumed
to have power utility where wealth plays an important role, outside wealth consists of a ¯xed
component and a portfolio of pre-existing stock and stock options with a stochastic payo®,
and the CEO exerts e®ort that a®ects all the moments of the lognormal distribution of stock
price. We then employ numerical methods to solve this bi-level optimization problem for the
optimal CEO compensation contract for a subsample of ¯rms from the Fortune 500 during
the 2000 to 2004 time period.
Our analysis produces three important results. First, in marked contrast to the conclu-
sions by Meulbroek (2001), Hall and Murphy (2002) and Dittmann and Maug (2007) that
do not solve the complete bi-level optimization problem between the principal and agent, we
¯nd that stock options are almost always an important part of the optimal CEO compensa-
tion contract. Second, consistent with Ase® and Santos (2005), restricting the compensation
contract to ¯xed salary, at-the-money stock options, and restricted stock produces roughly
the same expected payo® to owners as the optimal unrestricted second-best compensation
contract. This result suggests that simple observed compensation contracts are robust to
restrictions on the contract space. Finally, similar to the observations made by Core, Guay,
and Verrecchia (2003), the incentive e®ects of ¯xed salary, at-the-money stock options, and
restricted stock for some CEOs are dominated by the level and composition of the execu-
tive's pre-existing wealth. For these CEOs, the principal's choice of compensation contract
is essentially the amount of ¯xed salary that is necessary to satisfy the outside reservation
wage (i.e., the individual rationality constraint).
The remainder of the paper consists of six sections. The relevant prior research on ob-
2served executive compensation contracts is reviewed in Section I. We specify our agency
model and develop our numerical optimization approach in Section II. Section III discusses
our sample and measurement choices. The contracting results for our sample are presented
in Section IV. Section V provides sensitivity and validation analyses. Conclusions and limi-
tations are discussed in Section VI.
I. Prior Research
The analysis of compensation contract choice, especially the use of stock options and re-
stricted stock, has been a popular topic for analytical and numerical research. For example,
Meulbroek (2001) argues that risk averse and undiversi¯ed executives do not place enough
value on the risky payout they will receive from an option to justify the cost given up by
shareholders (and implicitly the incentives provided by the options). However, Meulbroek
(2001) does not model the incentive e®ects of the stock options and this makes it problematic
for her to assess the net bene¯t to shareholders from using stock options. Similarly, using the
certainty equivalent approach of Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991), Hall and Murphy
(2002) conclude that restricted stock (which is essentially an option with an exercise price of
zero) dominates options with a non-zero exercise price. However, their numerical results are
also based on a \partial equilibrium" analysis that does not formally incorporate the cost
of the option, the value to the employee, or the incentives provided by the options into an
optimization program. Since the incentives provided by stock options are a key reason for
their use in compensation contracts, it is impossible to make substantive conclusions about
the relative desirability (and optimality) of stock options or restricted stock unless incentives
are actually modeled in the analysis.
In contrast to Meulbroek (2001) and Hall and Murphy (2002), Kadan and Swinkels (2006)
3analyze and provide some empirical tests of a fully speci¯ed optimization model where the
agent's compensation contract consists of salary and either stock options or restricted stock
(i.e., a stock option with an exercise price of zero), but not both.1 Their formulation departs
from the traditional agency model by incorporating a minimum payment constraint or limited
liability (e.g., Innes (1990)) and a positive probability that stock price is equal to zero, which
they term \non-viability risk". Using the ¯rst order approach (FOA) to represent the agent's
optimization problem, Kadan and Swinkels (2006) ¯nd that stock options dominate restricted
stock when non-viability risk is zero.2 Using a sample of ¯rms from ExecuComp, they also
¯nd that the probability of bankruptcy (as a measure of non-viability) risk is positively
related to the use of restricted stock. Since the probability of non-viability risk is likely to
be low for most ¯rms, the results in Kadan and Swinkels (2006) imply that stock options
should be part of the optimal CEO compensation contract.3
Ase® and Santos (2005) examine a standard agency model where the agent takes either
a high or low action which results in a continuous stock price outcome. They also assume
that the FOA can be used to represent the agent's problem. The agent's salary is bounded
from below (but can be negative), the compensation contract consists of only ¯xed salary
1Feltham and Wu (2001) also develop a fully speci¯ed optimization model that includes either stock
options or restricted stock. They ¯nd that restricted stock dominates (does not necessarily dominate)
option-based contracts that when the agent a®ects only the mean (both the mean and the variance) of
the outcome, However, their model structure and solution technique exhibit several problematic features
such as a mean-variance approximation to the agent's expected utility which is unlikely to be accurate
when the agent's payo® is skewed with stock option contracts, reliance on the ¯rst-order approach which is
inappropriate for this setting, and unconstrained salary for the agent.
2In order to justify the FOA, Kadan and Swinkels (2006) assume that the distribution of F(xje), or
the cumulative distribution of stock price given the agent's choice of e®ort, satis¯es the convexity of the
distribution function (CDFC). It is interesting to think about what type distribution satis¯es this assumption.
In their numerical examples, F(xje) is set to either (1 ¡ e + ex) or (x + (1 ¡ 2x)(1 ¡ 2e)=2. It is di±cult to
image how these distributions translate into the real world distributions or how they are useful for motivating
empirical tests of hypotheses generated by a model making these distributional assumptions. In Section II.C,
we show that it is generally problematic to use the FOA for analyzing compensation contracts that involve
stock options.
3This hypothesis is somewhat at odds with the general observation that young technology ¯rms (with
a high probability of bankruptcy) aggressively use stock options, as opposed to restricted stock, in the
executive compensation programs (e.g., Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker, 2003).
4and stock options, agent wealth is explicitly considered in the model, and the power function
is used to represent the agent's utility function. The primitive model inputs are developed
by selecting parameters to mimic observed compensation payments and stock prices for a
typical ¯rm. Their numerical results suggest that the cost of moral hazard (where the agent
selects the low action) to the principal is large, but that the use of a simple stock option
contract can motivate the agent to select the high action with a very small additional cost.
Thus, Ase® and Santos (2005) show that stock options are an important component of the
observed executive compensation contracts.
Finally, Dittmann and Maug (2007) consider an agency model with a number of realistic
features and use the FOA to assess whether observed CEO compensation contracts are opti-
mal. In particular, their analysis assumes that observed compensation contracts implement
the optimal action and asks whether the principal can write a contract that induces the
same action with less cost. Thus, their analysis abstracts from the typical agency model
by focusing only on the contract design (which is only one level (i.e., the \upper-level" or
the principal's) of the bi-level optimization). They ¯nd the very surprising result that stock
options should almost never be part of the optimal compensation contract for CEOs.
Although this is a provocative conclusion, there are two questionable aspects in their
analysis. First, they appear to assume that the beginning stock price anticipates the optimal
e®ort that will be selected by the agent for a given compensation contract. If stock options
are issued at-the-money and the strike price already re°ects the expected optimal level of
e®ort, then stock options have little incentive e®ect because the payo® to the agent (i.e., the
intrinsic value) will be very small in expectation. Thus, it is not surprising that stock options
do not enter the \optimal" contract in the analysis by Dittmann and Maug (2007). Second,
their analysis relies on the ability of the FOA to construct a measure for the incentives
5imposed on the agent. As we demonstrate below, the combination of lognormal stock price
and power utility for the agent renders the FOA invalid, and consequently, their use of the
utility-adjusted pay for performance sensitivity is problematic.
This brief literature review illustrates that there is controversy regarding the use of stock
options in executive compensation plans. In order to provide some insight into the optimal
use of stock options, we develop an agency model that mimics many of the features of the
\real world" contracting problem between shareholders and the CEO. We also incorporate a
number of the structural features from Ase® and Santos (2005), Kadan and Swinkels (2006),
and Dittmann and Maug (2007) into our model.
II. Model
A. Basic Model Structure
We assume that the traditional moral hazard model is an appropriate representation of the
contracting problem involving shareholders and the CEO.4 Our model is based on a tradi-
tional single period agency setting with a risk neutral principal and a risk and e®ort averse
agent.5 Rather than selecting a set of assumptions to produce mathematical tractability, we
develop the structure of our model based on features of the contracting environment that
are observed in the real world. The cost associated with this choice is that the resulting
model will be mathematically intractable and numerical methods are necessary to generate
4We could have also used the adverse selection (or hidden information) rather than the moral hazard
(or hidden action) framework for modeling executive compensation. Although there is some debate about
which model best approximates contracting with a CEO, Milgrom (1987) and Hagerty and Segal (1988) show
that the adverse selection and moral hazard models are fundamentally similar and this modeling choice is
largely arbitrary. Although this is essentially true in our modeling, the use of limited liability complicates
the transformation from a moral hazard to an adverse selection model.
5Our model only focuses on incentive issues. We do not consider other potentially important determinants
of contract choice such as taxes, executive selection, and di®erential accounting treatments (e.g., salary versus
stock options). This is a limitation of our analysis, as well as the prior research reviewed in Section I.
6solutions. However, we believe that the insights produced by such a model outweigh the
absence of a closed form solution for the contract.
In our model, the risk and e®ort averse agent has an additively separable utility function
de¯ned over terminal wealth (which consists of pre-existing wealth and the current period's
compensation) and e®ort. The agent's disutility of e®ort is a convex and increasing function
of e®ort. The agent selects an e®ort level to maximize the expected utility of °ow compen-
sation provided by the principal and existing wealth less the disutility of e®ort. We assume
that the agent's e®ort choice is made to satisfy the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints.
Finally, we assume that the e®ort choice a®ects both the mean and variance of the stock
price distribution.6
The risk neutral principal selects a compensation contract to maximize the expected
value of the ¯rm net of the expected compensation payment to the agent. In our primary
analysis, the contract space is constrained to include ¯xed salary, stock options that are
granted at-the-money (similar to most actual option grants), and restricted stock. Thus,
the principal selects the level of salary, number of stock options, and number of restricted
shares in the °ow pay for the agent. Although this is a simpli¯ed characterization of actual
executive compensation contracts, base salary, stock options, and restricted stock capture the
majority of the value of compensation paid to executives. Similar to observed compensation
arrangements, we also require the salary to be non-negative (i.e., the agent has limited
liability).
The principal also observes the dollar level and individual components of the agent's
wealth at the beginning of the period. This is a reasonable assumption for the stock options
6As discussed below, the agent's action a®ects one of the parameters of the lognormal stock price distri-
bution, which e®ects all of the moments of the price distribution, including the mean and variance.
7and shares owned by the agent since these amounts are disclosed in proxy statements, but
it is perhaps more questionable for the other cash component of agent wealth. We assume
that the compensation payment satis¯es the traditional (ex ante) individual rationality (IR)
constraint that the expected utility of compensation less the cost of e®ort is greater than
or equal to the utility of the outside reservation wage that the agent can earn in the labor
market. This reservation wage is assumed to be constant and known to both the agent and
the principal.
The structure of our basic agency model (exclusive of the agent's pre-existing holdings
and ¯xed wealth) is given by the following program (#1):
maximize
(®;¯1;¯2;a)
IE[NP ¡ (® + ¯1P + ¯2 maxfP ¡ K;0g)ja]
subject to a 2 argmax
~ a
fIE[U(® + ¯1P + ¯2 maxfP ¡ K;0g)j~ a] ¡ D(~ a)g (IC)
IE[U(® + ¯1P + ¯2 maxfP ¡ K;0g)ja] ¡ D(a) ¸ U (IR)
® ¸ 0 (LL)
¯1; ¯2 ¸ 0 (SS)
¯1 + ¯2 · N (TS)
where N is the number of shares outstanding,7 P is the terminal per share price of the ¯rm's
stock, ® is the ¯xed salary payment, ¯1 is the number of shares of restricted stock granted to
the agent, ¯2 is the number of options granted to the agent with a strike price of K, D(a) is
the agent's disutility of e®ort, and U is the agent's reservation utility. (IC) and (IR) denote
the agent's incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints, respectively, (LL)
7Note that number of shares granted to the agent (i.e., ¯1) is a reduction to the principal's ownership of
the ¯rm, N. However, rather than modeling the options granted to the agent (i.e., ¯2) as a reduction of the
principal's equity in only certain states (i.e., when P > K), we model stock options as if a cash payment is
made to satisfy this claim upon the realization of the stock price.
8is the limited liability constraint, (SS) is the short selling constraint that precludes the agent
from short sales or writing call options, and (TS) is the total shares constraint which prevents
the agent's equity-based compensation from exceeding the ¯rm's total shares outstanding.
One important feature missing in program (#1) is the role of the agent's pre-existing
¯xed wealth and equity portfolio holdings of stock and options on the ¯rm's stock. Although
the principal's choice variables are the same as the case without pre-existing wealth, the °ow
compensation parameters only alter the agent's incentives incremental to those produced by
the pre-existing wealth. When we incorporate pre-existing wealth into the optimization, the
principal's problem is characterized by the following maximization program (#2).
maximize
(®;¯1;¯2;a)
IE[(N ¡ S)P ¡ Compensation ¡ Optionsja]
subject to a 2 argmax
~ a
fIE[U(Wealth + Compensation)j~ a] ¡ D(~ a)]g (IC0)
IE[U(Wealth + Compensation)ja] ¡ D(a) ¸ U
0 (IR0)
® ¸ 0 (LL)
¯1; ¯2 ¸ 0 (SS)
¯1;+¯2 + ¯3 + ¯4 + ¯5 · N (TS0)
where S is the agent's pre-existing shares and Compensation is the agent's compensation in
the current period with the following payo®:
Compensation = ® + ¯1P + ¯2 maxfP ¡ K;0g:
Options represents the payo® from the agent's pre-existing options which, as discussed fur-
ther below, fall into three di®erent categories, and ¯3, ¯4, and ¯5 (K1, K2, and K3) are the
9number (exercise price) of options in each category.8 The payo® for the pre-existing option
is de¯ned as follows:9
Options = ¯3 maxfP ¡ K1;0g + ¯4 maxfP ¡ K2;0g + ¯3 maxfP ¡ K3;0g:
Wealth is sum of the agent's pre-existing ¯xed wealth, shares, and stock options. U
0 is the
agent's reservation utility for both wealth and compensation and is de¯ned as follows:
U
0 = IE[U(Wealth + ExternalWage)]
The new total shares constraint (TS') precludes the agent from owning more shares and op-
tions (both pre-existing and from the current period's compensation) than there are shares
of the ¯rm outstanding. The remaining constraints are similar to those discussed above for
program (#1).
B. Concerns Regarding to the First Order Approach
The analytical and numerical analyses reviewed in Section II rely on the validity of the FOA
in their solution technique. This approach replaces the continuum of the agent's (IC) con-
straints with the ¯rst-order condition for an optimum. This \relaxed" version of the problem
is more amenable to solution by standard nonlinear optimization techniques. While there
are su±cient conditions where the FOA is known to be appropriate (e.g., Rogerson (1985),
Jewitt (1988), and Araujo and Moreira (2001)), there are no known necessary conditions for
its application. Moreover, the su±cient conditions found in the literature are highly special-
8The three categories are options granted last period, exercisable options, and unexercisable options. This
choice is related to the data that are available for developing model parameters (e.g., Core and Guay, 2002).
9We model the payo® from the pre-existing options as a contingent cash payment from the principal to
the agent for the realized intrinsic value of the options.
10ized (e.g., the convexity of the distribution function condition (CDFC) and the monotone
likelihood ratio property (MLRP)) and can easily fail in the economic setting in the papers
discussed in Section II as well as our model. Thus, it is important to verify the validity of
the FOA before proposing a solution strategy for program (#2).
It is straightforward to demonstrate the failure of the FOA for our problem using actual
company examples (we describe the sample and measurement choices below). The agent's
expected utility versus e®ort choices under the optimal compensation contract (consisting
of salary, at-the-money stock options, and restricted stock) is plotted in Figure 1 for Archer
Daniels Midland Co. and Paccar Inc. For both companies, this function has a \double hump"
and expected utility is not a concave function of e®ort. Since this type of agent response
raises concerns about the validity of the FOA, we do not use the \relaxed" version for gen-
erating our numerical solutions.10
C. Solution Strategy
We represent our model using discrete actions by the agent and continuous compensation
contract parameters. The use of discrete actions allows us to employ the solution techniques
of Grossman and Hart (1983) and avoid the reliance on the validity of the FOA. The Gross-
man and Hart (1983) approach also facilitates the search for a globally optimal solution for
the compensation contract.11
Since there are only a ¯nite number of actions, the Grossman and Hart (1983) approach
10Note that it is not necessary to show that the agent's expected utility is not a concave function of the
action, but it is su±cient. The agent's expected utility could be concave in action for any (or all) given
contract(s) and the FOA could still fail.
11Our action space is much larger than the typical binary action space (i.e., high or low action) that is
common in most prior research. We use 101 discrete actions by the agent and 501 discrete stock prices for
each action in our numerical analysis.
11¯rst replaces the agent's incentive compatibility constraint (IC) with the following set of
inequalities:
IE[U(®+¯1P +¯2 maxfP ¡K;0g)ja]¡D(a) ¸ IE[U(®+¯1P +¯2 maxfP ¡K;0g)jai]¡D(ai)
for each of the agent's i = 1;:::;M possible actions. We introduce a binary variable yi 2
f0;1g associated with each action ai 2 A so that y = (y1;:::;;yM) 2 RM. Finally, let eM
denote the vector of all ones in RM. The program for the optimal contract in program (#1)
can then be reformulated as the following mixed-integer non-linear program (MINLP), which










































® ¸ 0; ¯1 + ¯2 · N; ¯1; ¯2 ¸ 0
eT
My = 1; yi 2 f0;1g for all i = 1;:::;M:
Program (#3) has Q nonlinear variables (where Q is the number of stock price outcomes
for each action), M binary variables, one linear constraint, and (M+1) nonlinear constraints.
Since the agent will choose one, and only one action, the number of possible combinations on
the binary vector y is only M. Thus, we can solve M nonlinear (nonconvex) programs, where
yi = 1 (for i = 1;:::;M) and the other y¡i = 0. Among those M solutions, we then select
12In order to ease the notation in the text, these programs do not include agent wealth. The inclusion of
wealth is a simple extension to the programs.
12the feasible solution with the largest value of the objective function. Rather than solving
the program #3 using a mixed-integer nonlinear program solver such as MINLP (Fletcher
and Ley®er, 1999) or BARON (Sahinidis and Tawarmalani, 2004), we follow Su and Judd






±i IE[NP ¡ (® + ¯1P + ¯2 maxfP ¡ K;0g)jai]
subject to 0 · ±j ? f
M X
i=1
±i ¢ (IE[U(® + ¯1P + ¯2 maxfP ¡ K;0g)jai] ¡ D(ai))
¡(IE[U(® + ¯1P + ¯2 maxfP ¡ K;0g)jaj] ¡ D(aj))g ¸ 0
M X
i=1
±i IE[U(® + ¯1P + ¯2 maxfP ¡ K;0g)jai] ¡ D(ai) ¸ U




In general, this program has only (M +Q) variables and M complementarity constraints
with one linear constraint and one nonlinear constraint. The complementary constraints
require that if an (IC) constraint is not active (binding), then its multiplier must be zero. If
the particular (IC) constraint is active, then ±i = 1 and ±¡i = 0, for that particular action,
and we solve the corresponding nonlinear program. One advantage of this formulation is
that it enables more °exibility in the choice of nonlinear programming solvers. This enables
us to check the robustness of our solutions (by comparing solutions from di®erent solvers
such as KNITRO and SNOPT).
13III. Sample and Measurement Choices
A. Sample
Our sample consists of 46 ¯rms from the Fortune 500 where there was no CEO turnover
during the time period from 2000 to 2004. A list of these companies and their ticker symbols
are presented in Table I. These selection criteria obviously reduce our ability to generalize
our results. We impose these criteria because we use the four-year period from 2001 to 2004
to compare the model results to actual CEO compensation and assess the validity of our
model in Section V.B.13 Despite our modest sample size and the requirement for a constant
CEO, we believe that our sample is su±cient for providing insight into the use of stock
options in CEO compensation contracts for individual companies.
The descriptive statistics for our sample are presented in Table II (Panel A). Since we
are selecting ¯rms from the Fortune 500, it is not surprising that the mean (median) ¯rm
has very large with a market capitalization of $53,794 million ($12,871 million). In addition,
this sample spans a variety of industrial and service sectors of the economy.
B. Measurement of Model Parameters
We assume that agent's utility function can be characterized as a member of power class
of functions, or U(W + s) = 1
1¡±(W + s)1+± for ± ¸ 0, where ± is the coe±cient of relative
risk aversion, W is the agent's pre-existing wealth, and s is the current period (or °ow)
compensation. This utility function exhibits decreasing absolute and constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA). This choice is supported by the prior empirical work by Friend and Blume
(1975) and Litzenberger and Ronn (1986). We adopt the power utility rather than the more
13It is also necessary to use a sample much smaller than studies such as Dittmann and Maug (2007)
because the computational time required to solve our bi-level optimization is on the order of several hours
for each program for each company.
14common (at least in analytical work) negative exponential utility (CARA) because we believe
that managerial wealth is an important factor for understanding executive incentives. Friend
and Blume (1975) estimate the risk aversion parameter for the power utility to be between
two and three. Kocherlakota (1990) argues that this parameter is probably higher (perhaps
in excess of ten), although Lucas (1994) suggests that the parameter should be around 2.5.
Consistent with prior research, we set the coe±cient of relative risk aversion to two in our
primary analyses.14
Since a complete measure of CEO wealth is not available from public data, we develop a
proxy for this parameter. We assume that CEO wealth is composed of a ¯xed (nonstochastic)
portion that is uncorrelated with stock price and a stochastic portion composed of existing
stock options and shares owned by the CEO. We estimate the ¯xed dollar amount of CEO
wealth as ¯ve times cash compensation (salary plus bonus) plus an estimate of the value for
the supplemental executive retirement plan (measured as the present value, discounted at
the risk-free rate, of a 15 year annuity equal to 60% of the CEO's salary and bonus in the
most recent year that starts paying out ¯ve years after the current year).
The stochastic wealth consists of shares of stock, restricted stock, and stock options
owned by the CEO. Since complete information about the executive holdings are not avail-
able, we use the Core and Guay (2002) one-year approximation method with the information
reported in the ¯rst proxy statement of our sample period (i.e., for the 2000 ¯scal year end).
This proxy statement reports the agent's stock and restricted stock holdings from prior peri-
ods (which we group together and refer to as \pre-existing stock"), the number of exercisable
options and their inferred average strike price (\pre-existing exercisable options"), the num-
14As discussed further below, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on a subset of our sample companies. For
these companies we solve for the optimal restricted second-best contract under di®erent combinations of the
risk-aversion coe±cient (i.e., 0.5, 2, and 4) and the disutility parameter.
15ber of unexercisable options and the inferred average strike price (\pre-existing unexercisable
options"), and the number and actual strike price of any option grants from the year prior
to the proxy (\pre-existing new options").15 The one-year approximation method assumes
that the unexercisable (exercisable) options have a remaining life of one year (four years) less
than the life of the newly granted options.16 This distinction, however, is lost in our single
period setup, because we implicitly assume that all of the pre-existing option grants, as well
as any new grants in the optimal compensation package have the same life and, accordingly,
the same potential time value. The mean (median) ¯xed wealth for CEO sample is about
$27.36 ($25.57) billion (Table II, Panel B). Moreover, CEOs also have substantial wealth
invested in their company's equity though both stock and option holdings.
Consistent with a large body of ¯nance research and the basic distributional assumption
for the Black-Scholes model, we assume that the ¯rm's stock price is characterized by a two
parameter (¹ and ¾) lognormal distribution.17 We assume that the agent's action impacts
only the ¹ parameter (i.e., we assume that ¾2, the variance of the returns process, is ex-
ogenous) which shifts the mean of the underlying normal returns distribution and a®ects all
moments of the lognormal price distribution. Speci¯cally, a shift in ¹ will a®ect the mean
(exp[¹+¾2=2]) and variance ([exp(¾2)¡1]¢exp[2¹+¾2]) of the lognormal distribution. This
enables us to capture the natural risk-return tradeo® associated with agent e®ort because
increases in e®ort increase both the mean and variance of the lognormal price distribution.
The parameter ¾ is measured using the standard deviation of daily returns over the prior
15If there was more than a single option grant in the prior year, we aggregate the options together as if
there were a single grant of the total number of options with a strike price that preserves the sum of the
total Black-Scholes value of the individual grants. Thus, we ¯x the number of options in the aggregate grant
equal to the total number of options in the individual grants, and the Black-Scholes value of the aggregate
grant equal to the sum of the Black-Scholes value of the individual grants and solve for the unique strike
price and use the resulting number as the strike price for the \pre-existing new options".
16For the typical option grant with a ten year life, the one-year approximation method implies an estimated
life of nine years and six years, respectively, for the unexercisable and exercisable options.
17This assumption implies that returns are normally distributed, with mean ¹ and variance ¾2.
16year. The mean (median) annual ¾ for our sample is 0.489 (0.456)
One especially crucial modeling choice is the \production technology" that translates
the agent's e®ort (e.g., choice of strategy, operational investments, long-term investments,
and other similar managerial tasks) into ¹. We arbitrarily restrict (and implicitly scale)
agent e®ort to take discrete integer values between zero and 100. We also assume that ¹
is a piecewise linear function of the agent's e®ort (see the illustrative examples for Archer
Daniels Midland Co. and Paccar Inc. in Panels A and B of Figure 2, respectively). At an
e®ort equal to zero, we assume the ¯rm earns the risk-free rate of return. Since this return
is less than the ¯rm's estimated cost of capital,18 ¹ of the lognormal price distribution will
be negative, which implies a negative expected abnormal return. At an e®ort level of 29
(or the 30th action), we assume that ¹ is equal to zero, which implies the ¯rm's expected
return will equal its cost of capital. At an e®ort level of 100, we assume that the ¯rm
earns an annual rate of return equal to the annualized return implied by the high four-year
target price reported by Value Line.19 The value of ¹ implied by intermediate e®ort choices
are (piecewise-) linearly interpolated between these three points. We report distributional
statistics for the slope of each piece in Table II (Panel A) and we ¯nd that the production
technology is concave (convex) for 24 (22) of the ¯rms in our sample (untabulated).
Finally, in order to calculate each agent's reservation utility for the (IR) constraint, we
assume that the agent's compensation in the external labor market over the next four years
would equal four times the median (three-digit SIC) industry compensation for the most re-
18We estimate the cost-of-capital for each company using the Capital Asset Pricing Model with a risk-
free rate and market-risk premium equal to 5.24% and 6.00%, respectively (which are approximately the
prevailing rates at the beginning of our sample period). Each company's Beta was estimated using monthly
returns over the prior 60 months. These values are reported in Table II (Panel A).
19Note that the use of analysts' price forecasts assumes that analysts do not incorporate the expected
e®ect on the ¯rm's stock price of the CEO's actions that are induced by the observed contract. Using the
highest analyst forecasts rather than the average analyst forecast mitigates this problem because the highest
analyst forecast is more likely to have an idiosyncratic measurement error that overstates the maximum
outcome from agent e®ort
17cent year for all CEO's in the Fortune 500.20 We use four years in this computation because
this captures the approximate term for a CEO and we are using the four-year Value Line
forecast for returns. The agent's expected utility from the pre-existing (¯xed and stochastic)
wealth plus the industry median compensation is evaluated over the ¯rm's price distribution
induced by an action equal to zero (i.e., the ¯rm's expected return is equal to the risk-free
rate less the cost-of-capital) and the agent experiences no associated disutility of e®ort.
C. Scaling Constants
One common issue in numerical analysis concerns the choice of scaling for the objective
functions and constraints. Since the agent's utility is de¯ned over consumption of both °ow
compensation and wealth, it is necessary to scale these ¯gures in order to produce a utility
number that is \reasonable" for numerical analysis. For example, if the risk aversion param-






¡8, which is very close to zero from a computa-
tional perspective. Further, the agent's marginal utility is ($100;000;000)¡2 = 10¡16, which
is numerically indistinguishable from zero for conventional levels of precision.
In order to mitigate these types of numerical issues, we de°ate the agent's monetary
consumption (both pre-existing wealth and °ow compensation) by 129,000,000, which is
approximately the median value of total wealth for the CEO's in the Fortune 500.21 This
20Because the median industry compensation for all industries represented in our sample includes stock
options, we used the industry median annual Black-Scholes value of the options granted. We then calculate
the company-speci¯c number of at-the-money options that would yield the industry median Black-Scholes
value and use this number for the industry median compensation.
21The estimated total wealth for the executives in our sample is the sum of ¯xed wealth, value of their stock
holdings, and the Black-Scholes value of their various option holdings. Although many papers show that
a risk averse executive values an employee stock option at less than its Black-Scholes value (e.g., Lambert,
Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991), this should provide a reasonable approximation for computing a scaling
multiplier.
18scaling serves to \shift" the agent back on the utility function where both the (1) overall
expected utility from consumption is a smaller value (but larger in absolute value) and
(2) marginal utility of consumption is a larger value (e.g., the agent's marginal utility in
the example above would be ($100;000;000=$129;000;000)¡2 = 1:6641). Since utility is a
scale-free construct, this approach is empirically valid.
A more critical scaling parameter is the multiplier for the agent's disutility of e®ort. We
assume that the disutility function, D(a), is equal to a scaling parameter (¸) multiplied by
the square of e®ort, or ¸ ¢ a2. Since the agent's utility is additively separable in monetary
consumption and disutility of e®ort, this multiplier scales the agent's disutility of e®ort to
ensure that it is of the same \order of magnitude" as the utility from consumption. We
estimate this multiplier by determining the value of ¸ that will result in the observed com-
pensation contract for the median ¯rm in our sample. Speci¯cally, we assume that the agent
takes an action of 29 (i.e., the action that yields expected returns equal to the hypothetical
¯rm's cost-of-capital) and then solve for the multiplier for which the principal would select
a contract that is most similar to the median contract values observed in the data.22 A
crucial point to emphasize is that the arbitrary consumption multiplier (i.e., 129,000,000)
also a®ects the calculation of the disutility multiplier because the disutility multiplier is cal-
culated using the scaled median values for our sample. However, this preserves the relative
unscaled values of the marginal utility from consumption and the marginal disutility of e®ort.
22This approach for solving for the disutility multiplier assumes that our model represents the actual
contracting process between the principal and agent.
19IV. Results
A. Unconstrained Second-Best Solution
The results for the second-best solution with an unconstrained compensation contract are
computed using the basic structure of program #4 with two key changes. First, the uncon-
strained solution consists of a cash payment for each stock price outcome (as opposed to a
salary, stock option, and restricted stock contract) and second, agent wealth is included in
the problem. We solved for the optimal unrestricted contract for each of the 46 companies
in our sample and we present results related to the distribution of optimal contracts across
the 46 companies in Table III. In addition, the typical shape of the optimal unconstrained
contract is illustrated in Figure 2 for Archer Daniels Midland Co. (Panel A) and Paccar
Inc. (Panel B). The ¯rst plot in both panels of Figure 2 shows that the unconstrained
compensation function is convex for low stock prices and becomes concave at higher stock
prices. Both contracts provide zero payment to the agent until the realized stock price is
fairly close to the expected stock price given the optimal action. In this region, the contract
is highly convex (e.g., for Archer Daniels Midland Co., a change in the stock price from $12
to $13 produces an increase in the ¯xed payment from $0 to $178 million). This part of
the contract is very similar to an option. However, unlike an option, the payment is also
zero for very high observed stock prices. This occurs because the principal is likely to infer
that these high outcomes are due to a high random outcome (i.e., \good luck") as opposed
to the agent providing a high level of e®ort. Stated di®erently, for very high outcomes, the
principal is almost certain that agent deviated from taking the desired (i.e., optimal) action
so the principal pays the agent nothing in these cases.
The ¯xed payments to the agent are substantially larger than the typical °ow compen-
sation for CEOs (even after considering that the payments in Figure 2 are for a four year
20period). Although these payments to the agent are large (about $200 to $500 million), the
expected payo® to the principal is also extremely large for high levels of agent e®ort (approx-
imately $11 billion for both companies). In these cases, the principal is only paying 6.27%
and 2.75% (for Archer Daniels Midland Co. and Paccar Inc., respectively) of the change in
expected value of the ¯rm to the agent. The magnitude of the sharing rule given these levels
of wealth creation is consistent with the Haubrich (1994) critique of the Jensen and Murphy
(1990) challenge to the agency model.23
B. Constrained Second-Best Solution
The constrained second-best contract (consisting of salary, at-the-money stock options, and
restricted stock over four years) results are computed using the approach in program #4
and the results are presented in Table IV. As expected, the optimal agent e®ort is less than
or equal to the e®ort level observed in the unconstrained contract case. Similar to Ase®
and Santos (2005), we ¯nd that, on average, there is only a modest loss in expected payo®
to the principal when the constrained contract is used rather than the more complicated
unconstrained second-best contract. For our sample, the mean (median) loss in expected
stock price caused by using a constrained contract is only $273 ($52) million.
Before discussing our results, it is important to demonstrate that the model and pa-
rameter choices produce compensation contracts that are reasonably similar to the range of
actual CEO compensation contracts. In Table V, we compare the second-best constrained
optimal contracts to the actual CEO contracts for our sample companies. Although there
23These results provide some insights into the recent movement of executives from public companies to
private equity ¯rms (e.g., Thornton, 2006; Guerrera, 2006). It may be possible for private equity ¯rms to
implement something like the unconstrained second-best contract because there are no external constituencies
to satisfy or they have a more analytical economic approach to contract design. If this is the case, our model
provides a rational economic explanation for compensation payments to private equity partners on the order
of several hundred million dollars.
21are some di®erences between the optimal contract and the observed contracts in terms of
composition, the level of the total compensation is very similar. This illustrates that the
optimal contract contracts are plausible relative to contracts that are observed in practice.
The distributional statistics in Table IV show that options are almost always part of the
optimal contract and are almost always the primary source of new equity incentives (rather
than restricted stock).24 Similar to the optimal unrestricted contract presented in Table III
and Figure 2, options allow for the agent to receive payment only if a certain stock price is
achieved (namely, the beginning stock price in the case of options issued at-the-money, which
is the case in our analysis and in almost every observed compensation contract). In the case
of very low outcomes (assuming that a relatively high outcome is desired), the principal can
infer that the agent was unlikely to have taken the desired action and therefore does not pay
the agent. In the case of a very high outcome, the principal can likewise infer that the agent
was unlikely to have taken the desired action and does not want to pay the agent. This
can be achieved in the case of the unrestricted contract from the previous section, but not
with typical stock options where the payo® is not constrained. Although this is a limitation
of stock options relative to the unrestricted second-best contract, this structure dominates
restricted stock because stock pays the agent for both very low and very high outcomes
where the agent probably did not take the optimal action.
Although stock options are the dominant source of new equity incentives in most of
the optimal restricted contracts, they are not the only source (i.e., at least 1,000 shares of
restricted stock appear in the contract for 24 ¯rms, but not for the remaining 22 ¯rms).
We conjecture that the optimal restricted contract for certain companies relies, at least in
24We make the distinction between new equity incentives which come from any restricted stock and stock
options in the optimal contract and pre-existing equity incentives which come from the agent's previously
held stock and stock options. In addition, since the agent's utility function exhibits wealth e®ects, any salary
payment can also have an indirect on both the agent's new and pre-existing equity incentives.
22part, on restricted stock rather than solely stock options for primarily two reasons. First,
since we assume the agent's utility function exhibits wealth e®ects, restricted stock provides
a way for the principal to \insure" the agent in very low outcome states. In particular,
for very low stock price realizations, the agent's marginal utility is extremely high (since
the agent's wealth is concentrated in ¯rm-speci¯c holdings). Therefore, shares provide some
consumption to the agent in these states, unlike stock options. Second, when the principal
wants to induce a relatively low action (e.g., because it is either too costly or impossible
to induce the agent to take a high action), shares of restricted stock become relatively less
expensive (compared to stock options) less expensive, so they become part of the optimal
contract.
Although it is impractical to present the elements of the optimal restricted second-
best contract for each company, a few examples are instructive. First, consider the case of
Lyondell Chemical Co. (LYO). This company is relatively small (market capitalization of
$1.881 million) with a high volatility (sigma of 0.57, which is above the 75th percentile of
0.54), average risk (Beta of 0.73 which is roughly equal to the median value of 0.72) and
low growth (high VL forecast of 13.43% which is close to the value at the 25th percentile
of 13.25%). The CEO's pre-existing holdings consist of a large amount of ¯xed wealth
(about $31 million), relatively low share holdings (about 679,000 shares), and a relatively
high number of options (about 535,000 new, 309,000, unexercisable and 187,000 exercisable
stock options). The optimal restricted contract consists of salary of about $4,664,000, about
657,000 shares of restricted stock and about 9,000 stock options and this induces an optimal
e®ort of 26, which results in expected returns of slightly below the ¯rm's cost of capital. In
this case, the ¯rm's low growth prospects make a high action less desirable to the principal.
This coupled with the fact that the agent has relatively high-powered incentives from his
pre-existing wealth imply that the optimal contract will consist of primarily salary (which
23is the most cost-e®ective instrument for satisfying the agent's IR constraint).
A second (and more common) pattern is illustrated by the case of Proctor & Gamble Co.
(PG). The company is very large (market capitalization of $150 billion), has slightly below
average growth prospects (high VL forecast of 18.49% compared with the median value of
21.15%), is relatively volatile (sigma of 0.538, which is slightly below the 75th percentile) and
has average risk (Beta of 0.46 which is slightly below the median value of 0.47). The CEO's
pre-existing holdings are also fairly typical (with ¯xed wealth of about $11.4 million, about
641,000 shares of stock and about 787,000 total stock options). The optimal contract calls
for (almost) no salary or shares but about 3,500,000 stock options. In this case, the principal
wants to induce a relatively high level of e®ort (optimal e®ort of 89), but using restricted
stock to induce this e®ort would be too costly because the agent would receive a payo® in
every state up to (and beyond) the expected stock price given the optimal action { even
those states of a very low outcome which are almost improbable conditional on the agent
taking the optimal action. Since there is a relatively high expected payo®, at-the-money
stock options satisfy the agent's IR constraint in expectation.25
The components of the second-best constrained contract also vary considerably across
¯rms. There are three cases where the salary, number of at-the-money stock options, and
restricted share are trivial in magnitude (Hewlett Packard, United Technologies, and Harley
Davidson). For these companies, °ow pay has minimal incentives e®ects and serves primarily
to satisfy the agent's IR constraint and agent incentives are primarily produced by the pre-
existing exogenous wealth.26 For four companies (Rohm & Haas, Smith¯eld Foods, General
Mills, and Deere) the optimal constrained compensation contract is essentially all ¯xed
25Recall that the agent's IR constraint is an ex ante constraint that must only be satis¯ed in expectation
rather than an ex post constraint which would have to be satis¯ed in every outcome.
26We con¯rmed this point by computing the agent's e®ort choice after constraining °ow pay to zero.
24salary. In these companies, additional equity incentives are too costly for principal and
salary is used either to satisfy the agent's (IR) constraint and/or mitigate the agent's risk
aversion. Another feature of companies with a very large salary component in °ow pay is
that they tend to exhibit small values of systematic risk (Beta). The absence of stock options
and restricted stock in the °ow pay is a result of the low expected bene¯t in the production
function from using equity incentives to increase agent e®ort (up to action 30). Although
the production technology for these companies is likely to be convex after moving beyond
action 30, the expected bene¯t to the principal needs to be very high in order to compensate
the agent for the substantial disutility incurred at high levels of e®ort.
In 34 out of the 46 companies in our sample, the optimal second-best restricted contract
calls for a material amount (which we de¯ne as more than 10,000 units) of new equity incen-
tives (i.e., either restricted stock or stock options). The optimal contract for the remaining
12 companies consists almost entirely of salary. In 31 of the 34 cases where the contract
calls for new equity incentives, the contract consists of more options than shares of stock.
Further, in 27 of the 34 cases, the optimal contract calls for at least twice as many options
as shares of stock, and in 24 of the cases, the optimal contract calls for more than ¯ve times
the number of options as shares of stock. Although it is di±cult to make a comparison
of stock and option in terms of their relative importance in producing incentives and the
relative valuation to the CEO, the number of options vastly exceeds the number of shares in
the most optimal contracts. This result contrasts with the conclusions of Meulbroek (2001),
Hall and Murphy (2002), and Dittmann and Maug (2007). Thus, stock options dominate
restricted stock for most companies after the incentive e®ects of stock options are explicitly
considered in the analysis (which is absent from the Hall and Murphy (2002) analysis) and
incentives are correctly modeled (the limitation in Dittmann and Maug (2007)).
25V. Extensions
A. Sensitivity Analysis
Although we calibrated our model in the previous section to observed data, it is still necessary
to make assumptions about certain functional forms and parameters. In order to asses the
sensitivity of the result that stock options are usually a component of the optimal contract, we
solved for the optimal restricted second-best contract using a variety of alternative parameter
estimates. In particular, two important parameters for our model are the risk aversion
parameter and the disutility parameter. Therefore, we selected ¯ve companies (ADM, BC,
DOV, SLE, and TXT) where options are a large component of the optimal restricted second-
best contract and solved for the optimal contract varying both the risk-aversion parameter
and the disutility multiplier.
In the previous section, we used a coe±cient of relative risk-aversion of 2.0 and a disutility
multiplier of 0.000075. We estimated the model for the ¯ve companies using a coe±cient of
absolute risk-aversion of 0.5 and 4.0. Since the disutility multiplier and the CEOs' reservation
utilities are a function of the assumed level of risk-aversion, we estimated a new disutility
multiplier within each level of risk-aversion. We assume that our original disutility multiplier
was \low", so we multiply this ¯gure by ¯ve to yield a \high" disutility multiplier. Therefore,
we estimate the optimal restricted second-best contract for ¯ve additional sets of parameters.
The results of the sensitivity analysis for the ¯ve selected companies are presented in
Table VI. There are a few noteworthy general observations. First, for the combination of
low risk-aversion and a low disutility multiplier (i.e., the ¯rst row for each company), the use
of restricted stock is virtually nonexistent, but stock options are an important part of the
optimal contract. This combination implies that the principal wants to induce a relatively
high level of e®ort from the agent (i.e., the maximum level of e®ort in four of the ¯ve cases)
26which makes using restricted stock relatively costly. This again occurs because the expected
terminal stock price is high and using restricted stock provides the agent with a payo® over
the entire range of stock prices. Options, however, do not result in a payo® for the agent
below the exercise price, so the principal does not compensate the agent over this part of
the stock price distribution.
Focusing on the case where the agent's coe±cient of relative risk aversion is 2.0, as the
disutility parameter increases (from 0.000075 to 0.000375), the optimal contract (1) induces
a lower action and (2) supplants stock options with restricted stock in all ¯ve cases. With a
higher level of disutility, it is more costly to provide incentives to the agent, so the principal
accepts a lower level of e®ort at the optimum. And opposite of the ¯rst result discussed,
when the principal wants to induce a lower level of e®ort, restricted stock becomes relatively
less expensive for the principal because the restricted stock will result in less compensation
to the agent over the stock price distribution.
Finally, as the degree of risk-aversion increases, the use of stock options decreases. Al-
though it is di±cult to compare results across di®erent classes of risk-aversion (because of
di®erences in the agents' reservation utilities and di®erences in the disutility multiplier), this
result indicates that as the agent's risk aversion increases, the cost of using stock options
more than outweighs the increase in incentive bene¯ts (if any) from using stock options.
Since the payo® associated with stock options is riskier than ¯xed salary (which is risk-free
by de¯nition) and restricted stock, the principal is required to pay the agent a higher risk-
premium to use this form of compensation, which more than o®sets any potential increased
incentive bene¯t from their use.
27B. Validation
Although the optimal second-best constrained contract is presented in Table IV, it is also
instructive to estimate the agent e®ort and expected payo® to the principal using the actual
compensation paid to the CEO during the subsequent four years (2002-2005). In particular,
we use the actual compensation contract (which, like the optimal restricted contract, consists
primarily of a ¯xed salary, restricted stock, and at-the-money stock options) as an input for
our model and then compute the induced agent e®ort and expected payo® to the principal.
Although the contracts are di®erent than the constrained second-best contract, the agent's
e®ort choice is often the same with the actual observed °ow compensation (although the
expected payo® to the principal is lower in these cases). Another interesting output from
these computations is that we can also compute the expected value of the ? parameter
of the lognormal price distribution induced by the observed compensation contract. If our
model captures the important features of the contracting environment and if compensation
contracts have an important impact on ¯rm performance, then we should observe a positive
association between expected ¯rm performance (conditional on the observed contract) and
actual ¯rm performance.27 In Figure 4, we plot the average monthly excess returns (con-
trolling for the three Fama-French (1993) factors and Carhart's (1997) fourth momentum
factor) over the four year time period from 2002 to 2005 versus the predicted performance
induced by the actual contract. An ordinary least squares analysis reveals that the slope
coe±cient is 0.050 (p < 0:05, two-tail), intercept is 0.010 (p < 0:01, two-tail), and the R2
(adjusted R2) is equal to 8.41% (6.33%). These results are consistent with our expectations
and provide some validation of our agency model (and the associated functional forms and
27This analysis assumes that the market does not fully impound the expected optimal action in the
beginning price. If the model is correct and the market perfectly anticipates the optimal action then this
should be re°ected in beginning price and there should be no relation between predicted and future realized
abnormal returns.
28parameter estimates).
VI. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we develop and analyze a moral hazard agency model based on observed char-
acteristics of executives, typical compensation plans, and stylized features of the contracting
environment. Some of these features are (i) a compensation contract that consists of ¯xed
salary, restricted stock, and stock options granted at-the-money, (ii) ¯xed salary that is great
than or equal to zero (i.e., limited liability), (iii) power utility for the agent, (iv) pre-existing
wealth (both ¯xed and stochastic) which we show plays an important role in designing the
optimal contract, (v) lognormally distributed stock prices, and (vi) a production function
where agent e®ort a®ects all the moments of the distribution of stock price. We believe
that this model structure captures many of the important observed features of contracting
arrangements between owners (i.e., principals) and CEOs (i.e., agents).
Given the constraints and distributional assumptions of our model, it is not possible to
develop a closed form mathematical solution to the principal's problem. Therefore, we solve
the principal-agent model using numerical optimization methods. We represent our model
using discrete actions by the agent, discrete stock prices, and continuous compensation
contract parameters. The use of discrete actions allows us to employ the solution techniques
of Grossman and Hart (1983).
For our sample of ¯rms, we ¯nd that the optimal unrestricted contract (which is charac-
terized by state-contingent cash payments) exhibits option-like characteristics (i.e., a convex
payo®) over the lower range of outcomes. The optimal contract typically becomes concave
for high outcomes and then results in no payo® to the agent for very high outcomes (relative
29to the expected outcome when the optimal action is taken). This result occurs because from
an informativeness perspective, the relatively high outcome was unlikely to be the result of
an optimal action choice by the agent.
When we restrict the contract space to consist of only ¯xed salary, restricted stock,
and stock options granted at-the-money, we ¯nd that the optimal compensation contract
frequently includes large quantities of stock options, which mimic the payo® from the optimal
unrestricted contract over the most likely range of outcomes (given the action is taken by the
agent). These numerical results are at odds with the numerical results and conclusions by
Meulbroek (2001), Hall and Murphy (2002), and Dittmann and Maug (2007). The primary
reasons for these di®erences are that we solve the complete bi-level optimization problem
for both the principal and agent (rather than simply focusing on the agent's problem in
isolation) and we do not rely on the ¯rst-order approach in our solution technique (which
we demonstrate is invalid in this contracting setting).
Constraining the compensation contract to ¯xed salary, at-the-money stock options,
and restricted stock (as opposed to an unrestricted compensation contracts) also produces
roughly the same expected payo® to owners in most cases. This result is consistent with Ase®
and Santos (2005) and suggests that simple observed compensation contracts can be fairly
close to the optimal unrestricted contract. Similar to Core, Guay, and Verrecchia (2003),
we ¯nd that the incentive e®ects of ¯xed salary, at-the-money stock options, and restricted
stock are dominated by the level and composition of CEO wealth for some companies.
Finally, for a subsample of the ¯rms in our analysis, we demonstrate that the above
results are reasonably robust to our choice of parameters for agent risk aversion and disutility
of e®ort. We also ¯nd that the ¯rm performance predicted using our model and the observed
compensation payments is able to explain some of the actual excess stock price performance
30of our ¯rms. These results suggest that our model has at least some degree of validity.
Our analytical and empirical results are subject to a variety of limitations related to the
speci¯c assumptions used in our model. First, we rely on a lognormal distribution of stock
prices and our model captures only the risk-return tradeo® inherent in this speci¯c distribu-
tion. Although this is a somewhat standard assumption in the ¯nance literature, there are
other reasonable ways to describe the impact on the agent's e®ort choice on the distribution
of stock price outcomes. Second, our choice of the production function assumes that the
agent's productivity is a speci¯c piecewise linear function of both the ¯rm's cost of capital
and the analyst long-term price forecasts. Third, our model includes only a single action
that leads to a change in the distribution of stock price. The role of accounting information
and accounting-based compensation contracts (e.g., annual bonus or performance plans) is
ignored. Fourth, we assume that the power utility function describes the executives' pref-
erences for monetary consumption and that a quadratic cost function describes the agent's
disutility for e®ort. Finally, our analysis is conducted in a single period setting. This requires
us to abstract away from undoubtedly important features of real world contracting settings,
such as the early exercise of stock options (and thus their time value), inter-temporal e®ort
allocation, and consumption smoothing.
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Figure 1 
Agent Effort and Expected Utility for the Optimal Restricted 
Compensation Contract for Archer Daniels Midland Co. and Paccar Inc. 
This figure plots the agent’s expected utility as a function of his action under the optimal restricted contract (which 
consists of a fixed salary, restricted stock, and at-the-money stock options).  This optimization represents the lower-
level (i.e., the agent’s) optimization of the the complete moral hazard problem.  The figure illustrates that there are 
multiple local optima which is a sufficient condition for demonstrating the failure of the first-order approach as a 









Production Technology of the Relation Between Agent Effort 
and µ of the Returns/Price Distribution 
This figure plots the agent’s production function for Archer Daniels Midland Co. (ADM) and Paccar Inc. (PCAR).  The 
production function translates the agent’s action into the µ parameter of the lognormal distribution of stock price 
(which corresponds to the mean of a normally distributed returns distribution).  The production function is a piecewise 
linear function between (1) the risk-free rate of return and the firm’s cost of capital (calculated using the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model) and (2) the firm’s cost of capital and the high Value Line price forecast.  All returns are expressed 












































































































Optimal Unrestricted Second-best Contracts for the Optimal Action for  
Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) and Paccar (PCAR) 
The first figure shows the optimal unrestricted second-best contract (which consists of a state-contingent cash payment 
to the agent) and the probability density function of stock price, conditional on the optimal action of 75, for Archer 
Daniels Midland Co. (ADM).  The fixed payment to the agent (in millions of dollars) is on the left vertical axis and the 
probability of the realized stock price is on the right vertical axis and both are plotted against realized stock price which 
is on the horizontal axis.  The second figure shows the agent’s utility (on the left vertical axis) and the probability 
density function of stock price, conditional on the optimal action of 75, for ADM.  In both figures, a dashed vertical 
line indicates the expected stock price (i.e., the mean of the lognormal distribution) of $75.60 given the optimal action 
















































































































Figure 3 (continued) 
The first figure shows the optimal unrestricted second-best contract (which consists of a state-contingent cash payment 
to the agent) and the probability density function of stock price, conditional on the optimal action of 88, for Paccar Inc. 
(PCAR).  The fixed payment to the agent (in millions of dollars) is on the left vertical axis and the probability of the 
realized stock price is on the right vertical axis and both are plotted against realized stock price which is on the 
horizontal axis.  The second figure shows the agent’s utility (on the left vertical axis) and the probability density 
function of stock price, conditional on the optimal action of 88, for PCAR.  In both figures, a dashed vertical line 
























































































































Plot of Actual Excess Return versus Predicted Excess Return 
This figure shows the actual excess returns plotted against the predicted excess over the period 2001 to 2004.  The 
sample is the 46 firms in the Fortune 500 in 2000 that remained in the Fortune 500 every year from 2001 to 2004 and 
had the same CEO from 2001 to 2004.  Actual excess returns are calculated using the three Fama-French (1993) factors 
and Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor.  Predicted excess returns are calculated as µ using the agent’s optimal response 
to the observed compensation contract (of fixed salary, restricted stock, and stock options) along with pre-existing 
wealth and the assumption about firm-specific the production function.  The estimated intercept and slope are 0.010 
and 0.050, respectively. 
























































This table lists the sample of 46 firms companies used in this study in alphabetical order.  The sample was constructed using the 
companies in the Fortune 500 in 2000 remained in the Fortune 500 every year from 2001 to 2004 and had the same CEO from 
2001 to 2004.  The company name and ticker symbol are listed for each company. 
 
Symbol Name Symbol Name 
AAPL    APPLE COMPUTER INC  HRL     HORMEL FOODS CORP /DE/ 
ADM     ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO  INTC    INTEL CORP 
AMGN    AMGEN INC  ITW     ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC 
ASD     AMERICAN STANDARD COMPANIES INC  K       KELLOGG CO 
AVP     AVON PRODUCTS INC  LLY     LILLY ELI & CO 
BC      BRUNSWICK CORP  LXK     LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL INC /KY/ 
BDK     BLACK & DECKER CORP  LYO     LYONDELL CHEMICAL CO 
CAG     CONAGRA FOODS INC /DE/  MRK     MERCK & CO INC 
CL      COLGATE PALMOLIVE CO  PBI     PITNEY BOWES INC /DE/ 
CMI     CUMMINS INC  PCAR    PACCAR INC 
CSCO    CISCO SYSTEMS INC  PFE     PFIZER INC 
DD      DUPONT E I DE NEMOURS & CO  PG      PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 
DE      DEERE & CO  PX      PRAXAIR INC 
DF      DEAN FOODS CO/  QCOM    QUALCOMM INC/DE 
DOV     DOVER CORP  ROH     ROHM & HAAS CO 
EL      ESTEE LAUDER COMPANIES INC  SFD     SMITHFIELD FOODS INC 
ETN     EATON CORP  SII     SMITH INTERNATIONAL INC 
GD      GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP  SLE     LEE SARA CORP 
GIS   GENERAL MILLS INC  SUNW    SUN MICROSYSTEMS INC 
GM      GENERAL MOTORS CORP  TSN     TYSON FOODS INC 
HDI     HARLEY DAVIDSON INC  TXT     TEXTRON INC 
HNZ     HEINZ H J CO  UTX     UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP /DE/ 











Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics for Sample Companies 
This table provides distributional statistics of variables related to the 46 companies (listed in Table I) used in this study.  Shares 
outstanding is the number of shares outstanding (in millions) at the end of the 2001 fiscal year.  Price per share is the market 
price per share of common stock (in dollars) at the end of the 2001 fiscal year.  Market capitalization is the number of shares 
outstanding multiplied by the price per share (in millions of dollars) at the end of the 2001 fiscal year.  Sigma is the annualized 
standard deviation of daily returns over the 2001 fiscal year.  Beta is calculated from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
using the monthly return series over the 60 months prior to the end of the 2001 fiscal year end.  Cost-of-capital is the company-
specific cost of equity capital calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) with a risk-free rate of 5.24% and a 
market-risk premium of 6%.  High VL Forecast is annualized return implied by the Value Line high long-term target price.  
Slope 1 and Slope 2 are the slopes of the production function that translates the agent’s action (in the set {0, 1, …, 100}) to the 
µ parameter of the lognormal price distribution (which corresponds to the mean of the normal returns distribution).  Slope 1 is 
the slope between actions 0 and 30 where mu ranges between the risk-free rate and the firm’s cost-of-capital.  Slope 2 is the 
slope between actions 30 and 100 where mu ranges between the firm’s cost-of-capital and the annual return implied by the high 
















Outstanding  988 1,676 201 303 916 
Price per 
Share  47.20 22.25  34.60  46.32  61.64 
Market 
Capitalization  53,794 95,395  7,844  12,871  46,344 
Sigma 0.4891  0.1532  0.3888  0.4560  0.5435 
Beta 0.71  0.33  0.47  0.73  0.97 
Cost-of-capital 0.095  0.020 0.081 0.096 0.111 
High VL 
Forecast  20.05% 8.76%  13.25%  21.15%  24.68% 
Slope 1  0.00142  0.00067  0.00094  0.00147  0.00194 




Table II (continued) 
Panel B:  Descriptive Statistics for Sample CEOs 
This table provides distributional statistics of variables related to the portfolios of the CEOs of the 46 companies (listed 
in Table I) used in this study.  Fixed wealth is the executive’s total non-stochastic wealth (in dollars) which is estimated 
as five times the sum of the 2000 salary and bonus payment, plus an estimated SERP payment which is calculated as 
the present value of 60% of the 2000 salary and bonus paid out over 15 years starting five years into the future.  Shares 
of stock is the total number of shares of stock and restricted stock held by the executive as of the end of the 2001 fiscal 
year.  New options is the number of options granted in the prior year (i.e., fiscal year 2000).  New strike is the exercise 
price (in dollars) of the options granted in the prior year (i.e., fiscal year 2000).  If there was more than one grant in the 
prior year, new strike is a blended strike price calculated as the strike price of the total number of options that would 
produce an equivalent value to the total Black-Scholes value of all grants.  Unexercisable options is the number of 
unexercisable options reported on the proxy statement for the end of the 2001 fiscal year.  Unexercisable strike is the 
estimated average exercise price (in dollars) of the unexercisable options using the Core and Guay (2002) one-year 
approximation approach.  Exercisable options is the number of exercisable options reported on the proxy statement for 
the end of the 2001 fiscal year.  Exercisable strike is the estimated average exercise price (in dollars) of the exercisable 
options using the Core and Guay (2002) one-year approximation approach.  Reservation utility is the agent’s expected 
utility over the pre-existing wealth (consisting of fixed wealth, shares of stock, new options, unexercisable options, and 
exercisable options) and four times the most recent (i.e., fiscal year 2000) median industry compensation assuming the 













Fixed  Wealth  27,607,313 16,314,577 16,117,084 25,567,048 33,083,224 
Shares of Stock  8,971,551  21,286,121  692,873  1,037,915  3,722,520 
New  Options  1,375,999  5,858,256 173,750 325,000 637,500 
New  Strike  36.01 23.05 19.28 37.18 44.87 
Unexercisable 
Options  890,238 1,481,403  63,957  293,959 1,104,567 
Unexercisable 
Strike  34.04 22.87 16.34 35.88 48.56 
Exercisable 
Options  1,720,076  3,501,367 236,234 556,965 998,931 
Exercisable 
Strike  29.67 19.61 15.86 27.82 38.91 
Reservation 









Unrestricted Second-Best Solutions 
This table presents distributional statistics of parameters and values associated with the optimal second-best unconstrained (i.e., 
unrestricted) contract.  The optimal second-best unconstrained contract is a state-contingent cash payment to the agent for each 
stock price.  Optimal action is the non-negative integral action value taken by the agent.  Mu is the value of the µ parameter of 
the lognormal price distribution under the optimal action.  Scaled objective is the value of the principal’s objective function at 
the optimal contract.  Participation is the value of the agent’s participation (i.e., (IR)) constraint at the optimal contract, which 
is the agent’s expected utility at the optimal contract.  Objective is the value of the principal’s objective function (in millions of 
dollars) for the optimal contract scaled by the scaling multiplier (i.e., 129,000,000).  This can be interpreted as the payoff to the 
principal (i.e., total firm value), net of the compensation paid to the agent and the value of the agent’s pre-existing equity 
holdings.  Mean Price Dist. is the expected value of the price distribution following the agent’s action induced by the optimal 
contract.  Median Price Dist. is the median value of the price distribution following the agent’s action induced by the optimal 
contract.  Variance Price Dist. is the variance of the price distribution following the agent’s action induced by the optimal 
contract.  Skewness Price Dist. is the normalized third central moment of the price distribution following the agent’s action 
induced by the optimal contract.  This measures the degree of asymmetry in the distribution and values greater (less) than zero 
indicates positive (negative) skewness.  Kurtosis Price Dist. is the normalized fourth central moment of the price distribution 















Optimal  Action 45 31 25 33 74 
Mu  0.0378 0.0597  -0.0035 0.0033 0.0917 
Scaled 
Objective  53,064 99,029  9,317 13,830 45,037 
Participation  -1.8746  1.3302 -2.5320 -1.6344 -0.9990 
Objective  411.35 767.67  72.23 107.21 349.12 
Mean Price 
Dist.  53.43 21.66 37.95 52.75 70.56 
Median Price 
Dist.  33.80 16.78 21.34 35.36 46.24 
Variance Price 
Dist.            8,733             16,660        1,884        3,630           7,700  
Skewness Price 
Dist.  0.73 3.27 0.07 0.09 0.19 
Kurtosis Price 








Restricted Second-Best Solutions 
This table presents distributional statistics of parameters and values associated with the optimal second-best constrained (i.e., 
restricted) contract which is the solution to program #4.  The contract space is restricted to include only fixed salary, restricted 
stock, and at-the-money stock options.  Optimal action is the non-negative integral action value taken by the agent (in the set 
{0, 1, …, 100}).  Mu is the value of the µ parameter of the lognormal price distribution under the optimal action.  Salary is the 
amount of the fixed payment (in thousands of dollars) to the agent in the optimal contract.  Shares is the number of shares 
granted to the agent in the optimal contract.  Options is the number of at-the-money call options (in thousands) on the firm’s 
stock granted to the agent in the optimal contract.  Strike is the exercise price (in dollars) of the at-the-money call options 
granted to the agent in the optimal contract.  Scaled objective is the value of the principal’s objective function at the optimal 
contract.  Participation is the value of the agent’s participation (i.e., (IR)) constraint at the optimal contract, which is the 
agent’s expected utility at the optimal contract.  Objective is the value of the principal’s objective function (in millions of 
dollars) for the optimal contract scaled by the scaling multiplier (i.e., 129,000,000).  This can be interpreted as the payoff to the 
principal (i.e., total firm value), net of the compensation paid to the agent and the value of the agent’s pre-existing equity 
holdings.  Mean Price Dist. is the expected value of the price distribution following the agent’s action induced by the optimal 
contract.  Median Price Dist. is the median value of the price distribution following the agent’s action induced by the optimal 
contract.  Variance Price Dist. is the variance of the price distribution following the agent’s action induced by the optimal 
contract.  Skewness Price Dist. is the normalized third central moment of the price distribution following the agent’s action 
induced by the optimal contract.  This measures the degree of asymmetry in the distribution and values greater (less) than zero 
indicates positive (negative) skewness.  Kurtosis Price Dist. is the normalized fourth central moment of the price distribution 













Optimal  Action 44 31  23 31 73 
Mu  0.0361 0.0591  -0.0047 0.0013 0.0861 
Salary 8,280,176  36,213,657  192  26,478  2,401,238 
Shares   90,429  217,063  63  1,445  59,537 
Options    4,488,695 6,587,179  4,082 1,167,597 7,596,392 
Strike  47.20 22.25  34.60 46.32 61.64 
Scaled 
Objective  52,792 98,653 9,257 13,678 44,963 
Participation   -1.8277  1.1638  -2.5049  -1.7574  -1.0802 
Objective  409.24 764.75 71.76 106.03 348.55 
Mean Price 
Dist.  53.11 21.53  37.71 51.82 70.56 
Median Price 
Dist.  33.61 16.75  20.90 35.35 45.42 
Variance Price 
Dist.           8,652          16,640           1,884           3,620           7,700  
Skewness Price 
Dist.  0.73 3.27  0.07 0.09 0.19 
Kurtosis Price 




Comparison of Actual (Four-Year Aggregate) to  
the Restricted Second-Best Optimal Compensation 
This table presents distributional statistics for the observed (i.e., actual) contracts for the sample companies and the optimal 
restricted second-best contract from program #4.  Actual Salary is the annualized average amount of the expected fixed 
payment (in dollars) to the agent and is computed as the sum of salary, bonus, other compensation, and the target long-term 
incentive from performance share plans.  Actual Shares is the annualized average number of shares granted to the agent in the 
optimal contract.  Actual Options is the annualized average number of at-the-money call options on the firm’s stock granted to 
the agent in the optimal contract.  Optimal Salary is the annualized average amount of the fixed payment (in dollars) to the 
agent in the optimal contract.  Optimal Shares is the annualized average number of shares granted to the agent in the optimal 
contract.  Optimal Options is the annualized average number of at-the-money call options on the firm’s stock granted to the 
agent in the optimal contract.  Optimal Salary, Optimal Shares, and Optimal Options are drawn from Table IV.  ∆ Salary is the 
difference between Actual Salary and Optimal Salary.  ∆ Shares is the difference between Actual Shares and Optimal Shares.  















Actual Salary    
3,911,474 
  
3,098,408        2,438,839    
3,159,117  
   
4,400,750  
Actual Shares    
1,503,151 
  
3,017,305                   -              450,563      
1,744,228  
Actual Options            581,423            781,022           222,638            394,731             577,522  
Optimal Salary    
2,070,044 
  
9,053,414                   48                6,620             600,310  
Optimal Shares              22,607              54,266                   16                   361               14,884  
Optimal Options    
1,122,174 
  
1,646,795              1,021            291,899      
1,899,098  
∆ Salary  1,841,430  -5,955,007 2,438,791 3,152,497 3,800,440 
 
∆ Shares  1,480,544 2,963,039  -16  450,202 1,729,344 
 






















Sensitivity Analysis for Risk-Aversion and Disutility Multiplier 
This table presents the results of the sensitivity analysis for the optimal restricted second-best contract (from program #4) for 
five companies (ADM, BC, DOV, SLE, and TXT).  For each company, six optimal contracts are present for three different 
levels of risk aversion and two different levels of the disutility multiplier.  Company is the ticker symbol of the company.  
Optimal Action is the non-negative integral action value taken by the agent (in the set {0, 1, …, 100}).  Reservation Utility is 
the agent’s expected utility over the pre-existing wealth (consisting of fixed wealth, shares of stock, new options, 
unexercisable options, and exercisable options) and four times the most recent (i.e., fiscal year 2000) median industry 
compensation assuming the executive exerts an action of zero and incurs no disutility of effort.  Disutility Multiplier is a 
parameter from program #4.  Risk Aversion is the agent’s coefficient of relative risk aversion from the power utility function.  
Salary is the amount of the fixed payment (in dollars) to the agent in the optimal contract.  Shares is the number of shares 
granted to the agent in the optimal contract.  Options is the number of at-the-money call options on the firm’s stock granted to 
the agent in the optimal contract.  Objective is the value of the principal’s objective function (in millions of dollars) for the 
optimal contract scaled by the scaling multiplier (i.e., 129,000,000).  This can be interpreted as the payoff to the principal (i.e., 
total firm value), net of the compensation paid to the agent and the value of the agent’s pre-existing equity holdings.  
Participation is the value of the agent’s participation (i.e., (IR)) constraint at the optimal contract, which is the agent’s 










Aversion Salary  Shares  Options Objective  Participation   
  ADM     100  1.49708  0.0001  0.5            12,468               1,931           19,033,441                96.9   1.80691 
  100  1.49708  0.0005  0.5            82,922             14,229         421,866,837                61.2   4.52029 
  87  -2.247  0.000075  2          116,782             19,793           23,047,747                84.6   -1.8021 
  6  -2.247  0.000375  2                 581            370,330             2,659,282                43.9   -2.24698 
  100  -5.5735  0.00015  4                    4                     0                         0                98.5   -3.60473 
   41  -5.5735  0.00075  4                 115            165,483           31,026,080                53.0   -5.57348 
 BC      99  1.342  0.0001  0.5              9,618               1,066           56,255,534                10.8   2.26778 
  4  1.342  0.0005  0.5            20,471         1,633,950             5,636,559                 8.4   1.34207 
  72  -3.0069  0.000075  2          257,779            658,049           14,099,364                12.2   -2.95592 
  11  -3.0069  0.000375  2                  20         1,412,027             2,529,155                 8.9   -3.0069 
  100  -12.0617  0.00015  4        1,118,897            779,494                   2,394                15.5   -12.0608 
   41  -12.0617  0.00075  4              1,699         1,238,244             2,697,954                10.7   -12.0605 
 DOV     100  1.6503  0.0001  0.5            10,104                  467           13,376,909                96.4   2.24026 
  29  1.6503  0.0005  0.5        1,534,164            525,488           48,446,206                56.0   2.73166 
  38  -0.9705  0.000075  2              2,106         3,362,839           14,198,067                61.9   -0.97049 
  9  -0.9705  0.000375  2              3,037         4,319,310             4,314,054                49.5   -0.970453 
  35  -1.0272  0.00015  4        1,289,099         2,626,756                   2,238                62.3   -1.0271 
   9  -1.0272  0.00075  4        6,280,197         2,602,945                      720                50.2   -1.02717 
 SLE     100  1.456  0.0001  0.5                 430                    38           16,072,054              221.4   1.97032 
  99  1.456  0.0005  0.5          315,439             31,814         382,130,877              169.9   5.66259 
  86  -2.4062  0.000075  2                    2                     0           11,185,591              198.1   -2.13203 
  8  -2.4062  0.000375  2                    2            340,153             3,415,101              114.7   -2.4062 
  100  -7.1601  0.00015  4            18,663                  701                   1,455              223.6   -5.22201 
   44  -7.1601  0.00075  4                  46            339,133             7,987,272              140.5   -7.16009 
 TXT     100  1.7285  0.0001  0.5            12,881                  409             4,297,108   98.572431  2.04488 
    91  1.7285  0.0005  0.5                  49                     2           92,739,086   60.841565  4.61375 
  63  -1.17198  0.000075  2              1,447            759,430           18,237,296   66.496234  -1.17198 
  8  -1.17198  0.000375  2                  48         1,656,501             2,765,522   43.023306  -1.17198 
  74  -2.5685  0.00015  4            43,026               2,248               436,855   78.465992  -2.2874 
  14  -2.5685  0.00075  4          723,395            215,697               344,153   45.528166  -2.53993 
 
46 